



From Blockchain To Bench: Evaluating The Kleros Pilot In Mendoza's Judicial System

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Kleros Fellowship of Justice, 8th Batch, June 2025

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1. Executive Summary

This report documents a pilot project launched in 2024 between the Judiciary of Mendoza and the decentralised justice protocol Kleros, aimed at testing whether blockchain-based juries can support the resolution of small civil disputes within a public court framework.

The report initially analyses how Kleros functions and outlines the legal and institutional setting of the Mendoza judiciary. It reviews the three completed pilot cases and considers legal pathways for broader integration, including consumer arbitration under national law and expedited enforcement mechanisms under provincial procedure.

While still in its early stages, the pilot suggests that decentralised justice mechanisms may be able to complement traditional systems under the right framework and conditions. The experience highlights potential for scalability in other provinces and possibly the broader Latin American region. At the same time, it underscores the importance of proceeding carefully, with full attention to procedural guarantees, legitimacy and public trust.

The report concludes with a forward-looking view, recognising the adaptability shown by the Kleros team in responding to challenges and criticism, and Argentina's long-standing openness to legal innovation.

2. Introduction

Across the world, justice systems are facing growing pressure to modernise. Courts face challenges, including increasing case backlogs, demands for greater participation, transparency and efficiency. In response, the digital transformation of justice systems has been unfolding for some time. From online hearings and digital evidence to AI-assisted case triage. Among all, one of the most radical and potentially transformative approaches lies in decentralised justice.

In this context, Kleros is a protocol for decentralised dispute resolution. It uses blockchain technology and crowdsourced juries to deliver fast, low-cost, and transparent decisions. Based on game theory and economic incentives, Kleros allows anyone to submit a dispute, have jurors selected at random, and receive a binding or advisory decision enforced by smart contracts. Originally conceived as a tool for online platforms and Web3 applications, it has steadily evolved toward broader real-world use. However, it has simultaneously raised important questions about its legitimacy, effectiveness, and legal compatibility.

In 2024, the Judiciary of the Mendoza Province, in Argentina, signed a cooperation agreement with Coopérative Kleros, launching one of the first official partnerships between a public court and a decentralised justice protocol. The pilot, led by the Peace and Contraventional Court of Lavalle, was designed to evaluate whether a blockchain-based jury system could support the resolution of certain low-complexity civil cases. While the decisions issued by Kleros in this pilot are non-binding and purely consultative, the experiment provides valuable insight into the real-world applicability of decentralised justice in a traditional legal environment.

The overall aim of this report is to document and analyse the cooperation agreement and the pilot cases unfolding in real time. It strives to be a useful source of consultation for anyone interested in the subject, including fellow legal professionals, other Court members who may consider integrating decentralised justice systems into their own, and the citizens of jurisdictions where similar models may be implemented.

Having this objective in mind, the report begins with an overview of the Kleros protocol: how it functions, how it selects jurors, and how it uses token-based incentives to encourage fair decision-making. It then examines how legitimacy has been a core challenge in decentralised systems, and how Kleros has responded through identity verification tools such as Proof of Humanity and curated registries. Other digital ID systems like QuarkID are also mentioned.

Secondly, the report turns to the institutional and legal framework of the Judiciary of Mendoza. It explains how Argentina's federal structure allows provinces to operate autonomous judicial systems, and outlines the relevant procedural laws, court structure, and applicable legal instruments. Particularly, it is mentioned the use of arbitration and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in cases such as consumer debt and traffic claims.

In a third section, the report provides a detailed account of the Cooperation Agreement between the Judiciary of Mendoza and Kleros. It discusses the institutional context in which the pilot emerged, the obligations of each party, the scope and non-binding nature of the decisions, and the innovation ecosystem established by the Mendoza Supreme Court to support projects like this. Following it, the results of the first three pilot cases are examined, which were based on real disputes previously resolved by the Lavalle Court. The section compares Kleros jury decisions with the original court rulings, offering early evidence on the coherence, speed, and reliability of decentralised decision-making under real legal standards.

The report concludes with an analysis of the scalability potential of decentralized justice, legal avenues for its further reflection, and the broader implications of the Mendoza experience for judicial innovation, including questions about legitimacy, scalability, and public trust.

3. Understanding Kleros: A Protocol for Decentralised Justice

3.1 Introduction

Kleros is a decentralised dispute resolution protocol built on the Ethereum blockchain. It functions as an autonomous third party, capable of arbitrating a wide range of disputes: from simple agreements to highly complex contracts. Rather than depending on a centralised authority or the integrity of individual actors, Kleros uses economic incentives and principles from game theory to ensure that jurors are motivated to reach fair and consistent decisions.

When creating an arbitrable contract, it is crucial for the parties to choose a court that possesses expertise in the particular subject of the agreement. For instance, a software development contract should designate a court specialised in software development matters, while an insurance contract would opt for an insurance court. The court system resembles a tree hierarchy, with the General Court at its apex. Below it, specialized sub-courts would address specific fields, such as blockchain, onboarding, curation, marketing, data analysis, video production, and other relevant sectors.¹




Image retrieved from: [Court | Kleros](https://www.kleros.io/court)

The protocol operates through a fully automated process, including the submission of evidence, random selection of jurors, and enforcement of rulings. By decentralising these stages and securing them with blockchain technology, Kleros offers a dispute resolution system that is transparent, efficient, cost-effective, and resistant to manipulation. It is designed to serve as a multipurpose digital court,

¹ [Court | Kleros](https://www.kleros.io/court)

providing fast and reliable arbitration in both digital-native and traditional legal contexts.

3.2 Overview of Kleros Arbitration Process

Kleros operates as an opt-in arbitration system integrated into Ethereum smart contracts. When parties enter into a contract, they opt into Kleros and designate which court within the system will handle disputes. If a disagreement arises, the case is submitted to the designated court.

Juror candidates pre-stake PNK (Pinakion) tokens within that specific court, and higher stakes increase the chance of selection. Once the staking period ends, jurors are chosen randomly, with the probability proportional to staked tokens. This creates a jury of typically three or more individuals.

The case then enters its evidence submission period where all interested parties (disputing parties, jurors, challengers, and any external agent) are able to upload their evidence to the platform.

Jurors receive this bundle, deliberate independently without communication, and vote during a private voting period. Votes are submitted using a commit-reveal scheme to ensure confidentiality and prevent undue influence. At the moment, Kleros jurors can only vote binary choices (“yes”, “no”), and “refuse to arbitrate” (the latter is available in cases of invalid submissions, illegal or morally unacceptable content or evidence).²

Once the voting phase closes, the majority decision is determined by the system and the outcome is enforced automatically through smart contracts (such as the release of funds), concluding the case in an efficient, trustless manner.³

The system incorporates strong economic incentives to promote integrity and discourage dishonest behaviour. Jurors whose votes align with the final decision (deemed “coherent”) receive rewards from the arbitration fees and a share of the staked PNK of jurors who voted incoherently. Those in the minority lose part or all of their staked tokens. In addition, an appeal mechanism allows parties to contest a decision by paying higher fees and triggering the selection of a larger jury, increasing both the cost and deliberative rigour. Each successive appeal layer raises the stakes, creating a disincentive for frivolous challenges and encouraging honest initial voting.⁴

² Ibid

³ Whitepaper, pp. 1-4.

⁴ Whitepaper, pp. 4-7.

All procedural stages are fully automated via smart contracts, including: submission of disputes, juror staking, randomised selection, private voting, decision execution, and appeals. The randomisation relies on unpredictable Ethereum block hashes to draw jurors in a manipulation-resistant manner. This ensures that juror selection and ruling execution are transparent, tamper-proof, and efficient. As a result, Kleros provides a decentralised, swift, cost-effective, and reliable system for resolving disputes on-chain.⁵

3.3 Game Theory Foundations

Kleros incentivises honest juror behaviour using a mechanism based on Schelling point theory. Jurors are motivated to vote for the option they believe the majority will also choose. If a juror sides with the majority, they receive a reward drawn from arbitration fees and the staked PNK of dissenters. Conversely, minority voters lose part or all of their stake. This setup aligns each juror's financial incentives with honest rulings.⁶

3.4 How the PNK Token Works

The term “pinakion” (πινάκιον in Ancient Greek) literally means “small tablet” or “plaque”. It referred to a bronze or wooden plate that was used in ancient Athens to record the identity of citizens, particularly for jury selection in democratic processes. Each citizen eligible for jury duty had a pinakion inscribed with their name and district.

In the context of Kleros, the PNK token is a native ERC-20 token that can be used both to stake it and become a juror, and in governance (by giving voting rights for new proposals and courts).⁷

The PNK token furthermore serves two other key purposes. First, protecting the system from sybil attacks: if jurors were selected purely at random, a malicious actor could create many fake addresses to increase their chances of being chosen repeatedly in disputes. Second, PNK provides the incentive to vote honestly by rewarding coherent jurors while penalising incoherent jurors.⁸ This way, the token enforces economic consequences for dishonest behaviour and promotes integrity within the system's dispute resolution process.

⁵ Whitepaper, pp. 3-4.

⁶ Whitepaper, pp. 2, 7-8.

⁷ Kleros. (n.d.). *PNK token*. Kleros. <https://docs.kleros.io/pnk-token>

⁸ Whitepaper, p. 4.



Juror Incentives

Users need to stake PNK in order to be drawn as jurors in disputes



Attack Protection

The PNK token protects against malicious actors



Platform Governance

The PNK token is used for voting in platform governance

Image retrieved from: [PNK Token / Kleros](#)

3.5 Kleros 2.0 Beta

While Kleros 1.0 was launched in 2019, in November 2024 Kleros announced Kleros 2.0 Beta on Arbitrum One. This is a foundational version that allows the testing of core features in a controlled live environment and allows for community feedback. The new version prioritizes security, usability and system performance. It includes a redesigned interface, and a rebuilt backend infrastructure, known as Kleros Atlas.

Access to Kleros 2.0 Beta is currently limited to a select group: participants from the earlier v2 testnet, existing Kleros v1 jurors, and users registered on Proof of Humanity v1. These eligible users can claim a special Beta-Testing NFT which grants access to participate in Kleros 2.0 Beta cases. In other words, this allows the creation of a centralized “whitelist”.

Although still in its testing phase, Kleros 2.0 is built with a modular design. This means it can support future upgrades more easily, such as new dispute resolution tools and interoperability across different blockchain networks. Eventually, decisions made on Arbitrum could be enforceable on other chains as well.⁹

3.6 Real-World Applications

Kleros allows for a wide range of use cases, ranging from small claims, insurance, e-commerce, freelancing, token listing, intellectual property, to content moderation. To exemplify, Web2 companies can decide to use Kleros decentralised courts for users’ complaints, being that those conflicts arise between the user and the company, or between users themselves (as it could happen in a marketplace).¹⁰

A more concrete example is the integration between Kleros and Lemon Cash (a cryptocurrency wallet application from Argentina) which allows Lemon Cash users to submit claims to a Kleros court. After the claim is submitted, a team from Lemon

⁹ [Kleros 2.0 Beta is Here: Get Started](#)

¹⁰ Kleros Notion Site, Industry Guides, Industry pages, Web 2.0 companies [Web 2.0 companies](#)

Cash presents its answer, and decentralised jurors will resolve the matter within 5 days. If the decision is favourable to the claimant, Lemon Cash must comply with it within 2 days. If the decision is favourable to Lemon Cash, the claimant can continue the dispute via traditional justice systems. For a dispute between a user and Lemon Cash to be eligible for resolution by a Kleros court, it must meet several criteria: the claim amount should not exceed USD 150, the issue must be quantitative in nature, the Lemon Cash support team must have provided a negative solution, and the transaction must have occurred after the integration was launched on June 12, 2024.¹¹

3.6.1 Real-world applications: the Kleros case in Mexico

A particularly relevant case for this Report involved the recognition and enforcement of a Kleros decision by a Mexican court. In 2020, in Guadalajara, Jalisco, two parties entered into a real estate leasing contract governed by Mexican law, which included an arbitral clause. This clause appointed an arbitrator and instructed them to use the Kleros protocol to govern the decision. When a dispute did arise, the arbitrator issued an order to Kleros, which rendered a decision. Despite the absence of prior legal precedent on this, the Mexican court examined the legal nature of the arbitral award, recognised its validity, and ordered its enforcement to public authorities.¹²

¹¹ [Justicia descentralizada en Lemon con Kleros - Lemon Crypto Wiki](#)

¹² [How to Enforce Blockchain Dispute Resolution in Court? The Kleros Case in Mexico](#)

4. Juror Selection and Legitimacy Mechanisms in Decentralised Justice

4.1 The Core Challenge: Can You Trust a Random Juror Online?

Until now, the Kleros system appears promising: it offers a fast, cost-effective, and potentially transformative model for dispute resolution. It introduces decentralisation, automation, and citizen participation into judicial processes. However, a fundamental question arises: how are the jurors chosen, and why should their decisions be trusted?

In traditional judicial systems, legitimacy stems from institutional safeguards. Judges and jurors are appointed or elected in accordance with established legal procedures, and their identities are verified and publicly known.

By contrast, Kleros was initially designed according to the principles of permissionless blockchain architecture, with Jurors selected randomly from anonymous users who staked tokens in the system. These users could come from anywhere worldwide and had no obligation to disclose their identity, background, or qualifications. While this model enabled decentralisation and resistance to capture, it also raised difficult questions. Can anonymous jurors, motivated purely by financial incentives, fairly and reliably solve legal disputes?

4.2 Juror Selection in Kleros: From Anonymous Token Holders to Verified Humans

In the initial design of Kleros, Jurors were anonymous token holders who staked the native PNK token as a form of economic commitment. This staking mechanism was intended to align juror incentives, ensuring that arbitrators acted honestly to avoid losing their stake. However, as noted in the previous section, this model raised some concerns regarding legitimacy and fairness.

Nathan Schneider highlighted this in his 2022 paper *Cryptoeconomics as a Limitation on Governance*. He argues that the lack of juror identity conflicts with traditional justice values of fairness and accountability, and that relying on token holdings is problematic as it grants more influence to those with greater financial resources, undermining due process.

In a recent Panel on *Blockchain Identity & Jury Selection: Building Trust in Decentralised Courts* at the Mechanism Design for Decentralised Justice

Conference, Federico Ast explained that the original system was “completely financialised,” with anonymous arbitrators motivated primarily by economic interests. Since the identities behind the blockchain addresses were unknown, staking tokens was necessary to provide jurors with tangible incentives against dishonest rulings. However, this financialization meant that jurors remained anonymous, and their identity or qualifications were never verified.¹³

To address these concerns, Kleros improved the model by introducing an on-chain identity verification process called Proof of Humanity. This process is designed to confirm that each address corresponds to a real, verified, unique human being. The process involves several key steps:

1. **Submission:** A user submits a profile including a photo, a video stating that they are not already registered, the blockchain address to be verified, and a deposit.
2. **Vouching:** An existing verified member must vouch for the new submission, which provides an initial layer of trust.
3. **Community Verification:** During a defined period, the wider community can challenge the submission if they suspect a duplication of profiles, fraud, or that the submission was not carried out by a real human.
4. **Adjudication:** If the submission is challenged, a trial takes place where a jury decides whether the profile is valid. If the challenge is successful, the challenger is rewarded with the submitter’s deposit.
5. **Acceptance:** If the profile passes verification and no valid challenge is upheld, the submission is accepted, and the deposit is returned to the user.¹⁴

This system ensures a robust identity verification and prevents Sybil attacks or multiple profiles controlled by the same individual. The verified profiles enable Kleros to enforce a “one person, one vote” system rather than influence based on token holdings alone.¹⁵

Furthermore, this identity framework opens the door to more sophisticated juror selection criteria, such as using soulbound tokens to certify specific attributes such as residency, citizenship, or professional qualifications. This could enable targeted juror pools tailored to the nature or jurisdiction of disputes, enhancing both the fairness of the process and the legitimacy of the decision.¹⁶

¹³ [Panel | Blockchain Identity & Jury Selection: Building Trust in Decentralised Courts | MD4DJ 2025 - YouTube](#)

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Ibid

4.3 Other Tools for Juror Identification: Kleros Curate and Decentralised Registries

Besides Proof of Humanity, Kleros has developed additional tools to support transparent identity verification and information curation within decentralised systems. One of the core mechanisms is Kleros Curate¹⁷, a protocol for creating and maintaining token-curated registries. These are on-chain lists that are maintained by a community through dispute resolution and economic incentives. Anyone can submit an entry (such as a profile, skill, or document), which can be accepted, challenged, or removed through a structured process involving deposits, community review, and arbitration by jurors.

In the context of juror selection, Kleros Curate enables the creation of verified lists of eligible jurors based on customisable criteria, including geographic location, professional background, or specific certifications. Because each entry can be challenged and reviewed through the Kleros court system, the integrity of the registry is maintained collectively and transparently.

These curated registries can integrate Proof of Humanity or other identity protocols. This way, for example, a registry could be created listing lawyers certified in a given jurisdiction or residents of a specific city, with eligibility verified through on-chain or identity documentation. This approach further allows Kleros to move beyond random selection among anonymous users and toward more tailored jury pools that could better match the nature of each particular case.

4.4 Beyond PoH: QuarkID and Other On-Chain Identity Solutions

While Proof of Humanity represented a major step toward identity verification in decentralised justice, it is not the only model. Other systems have emerged that can serve as alternatives or complements to PoH, including biometric and state-linked identity protocols.

One notable example is QuarkID¹⁸, a public initiative developed by the Government of Buenos Aires in collaboration with Web3 identity providers. It aims to provide every citizen with a self-sovereign, blockchain-based identity. These digital IDs can be used to prove residence, access public services, or verify civic credentials on-chain. Unlike Proof of Humanity, which is permissionless and community-driven, QuarkID is rooted in state authority, offering greater assurance of legal validity and institutional trust.

¹⁷ [Curate | Kleros](#)

¹⁸ [QuarkID](#)

The integration of such systems into Kleros could significantly enhance the legitimacy of juror selection by enabling:

- I. **Location-based juror pools:** ensuring that only residents of a particular city or province (e.g. Mendoza) are selected to rule on local disputes.
- II. **Qualification-based juror pools:** filtering jurors based on verifiable credentials or skills, potentially certified via soulbound tokens or tokenised diplomas issued by academic or professional institutions.

These developments would not only improve fairness and relevance in decision-making but also align decentralised justice platforms more closely with traditional expectations of legal identity, jurisdiction, and due process.

5. The Judiciary of Mendoza: Legal Context and Institutional Framework

Having examined how Kleros operates as a decentralised justice system and the different mechanisms for juror selection, the next step is to turn to the institutional context in which the pilot takes place. Understanding the legal and institutional framework of the local court system is key to assessing how this pilot fits within existing structures and whether it can work alongside traditional forms of justice.

5.1 Argentina's Federal System

The first Article of Argentina's National Constitution establishes it as a federal republic. Consequently, Articles 5 and 123 mandate that Argentina's judicial system be organised at two levels: a national judiciary and independent provincial judicial systems.

Provincial courts have jurisdiction over civil, commercial, criminal, labour, family, and administrative matters not delegated to the national level. This dual structure means that the Province of Mendoza, like other provinces (and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires), maintains an autonomous judicial system with its own laws, procedures, and courts.¹⁹

5.2 Court System of Mendoza: Structure and Competencies

The Province of Mendoza, pursuant to its Civil, Commercial, and Tax Procedural Code, Law No. 9001 (*Código Procesal Civil, Comercial y Tributario de la Provincia de Mendoza, Ley 9.001*²⁰), operates its own judicial system headed by the Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza. The latter serves as the highest court and oversees the administration of justice across the province. Below it, the system comprises multiple levels of lower courts, including courts of first instance and courts of peace.²¹

Among the first-instance courts, the Peace and Contraventional Courts (*Juzgados de Paz Letrado y Contravencional*) have jurisdiction over specific matters. These include:

¹⁹ [Organización - Justicia.ar](https://www.justicia.gov.ar/organizacion)

²⁰ Law 9001 (Mendoza), Código Procesal Civil, Comercial y Tributario de la Provincia de Mendoza
[SAIJ - Código Procesal Civil, Comercial y Tributario de la Provincia de Mendoza](https://www.saij.gov.ar/codigo-procesal-civil-comercial-y-tributario-de-la-provincia-de-mendoza)

²¹ [Mendoza - Justicia.ar](https://www.justicia.gov.ar/mendoza)

I. Cases by subject matter, regardless of the monetary amount, as set out in Article 5 Law No. 9001:

- Disputes arising from tenancy agreements (e.g. rent recovery, damage to the rented damage, evictions).
- Evictions related to *commodatum* agreements.
- *Monitorio* proceedings, which include, among others, credit card debts.

II. Cases by monetary amount, as set out by Article 7 of Law No. 9001:

- Disputes involving amounts below 20 JUS (as defined by provincial law), which, as of the latest update, equals ARS \$9,825,963.80.²² If the value of the claim exceeds this threshold, the jurisdiction lies with a Civil Court.

III. Less serious transgressions that disrupt the community, as set out in the Code of Contraventions of the Province of Mendoza, Law No. 9099 (*Código de Contravenciones de la Provincia de Mendoza, Ley 9.099*²³).

- Some examples include contraventions against authority, public order, morality, public health, animals and the environment.²⁴

These courts are designed to offer efficient, accessible, and cost-effective justice for low-value or less complex legal matters. This institutional structure is central to understanding the scope of the pilot agreement between the Mendoza Judiciary and Kleros.

5.3 The “Proceso Monitorio” and Alternative Dispute Resolution under Law No. 9001

The *monitorio* process (which may be translated as *Summary Debt Collection Procedure*) is a swift and cost-effective judicial mechanism that allows the enforcement of certain obligations when the debtor does not object to the process.

²⁵ Regulated under Book III, Title I, of Mendoza’s Civil, Commercial, and Tax Procedural Code, Law No. 9001, it enables creditors to recover liquidated and documented debts through an expedited proceeding.

Article 232 of the above-mentioned Law provides for this procedure in controversies involving credit card debts, claims for specific amounts involving movable goods or determined items, liquidated monetary debts arising from rental agreements, execution of enforceable instruments (excluding the enforcement of court judgments), and outstanding balances from bank current accounts, among other scenarios.

²² As retrieved on 14 June 2025 from [Fuero Paz - Poder Judicial Mendoza](#).

²³ Law 9099 (Mendoza), Código de Contravenciones
[Ley-9099-Código-Contravencional-de-la-Provincia-de-Mendoza.pdf](#)

²⁴ [Fuero Contravencional y de Paz - Poder Judicial Mendoza](#)

²⁵ [Proceso monitorio: una técnica judicial para reclamar obligaciones | Argentina.gob.ar](#)

Notably, paragraph j) of Article 232 also allows the *monitorio* procedure for claims based on “other instruments that have executive force by law or by private agreement and are not subject to a special procedure.”²⁶

By Article 234, to initiate the proceeding, the actor must present the enforceable instrument in accordance with “substantive legislation, public or private instrument judicially recognised or whose signature is certified by a notary public, and from whose content arises the right on which the action is based.”²⁷ Once the case is opened, the Judge will review the legality of the instrument and, within five days, issue a sentence ordering the execution of the title. The defendant has five days from notification to request the annulment of the proceeding.

Lastly, it is especially worth mentioning that Article 2.c) of Law No. 9001 demands that Judges, Lawyers, and members of the Prosecutor’s Office promote the use of alternative dispute resolution methods, such as conciliation, settlement, mediation, and arbitration.

5.4 Other Relevant Substantive Legal Framework

5.4.1 National Credit Card Law (Law No. 25.065)²⁸

Argentina’s National Law 25.065 regulates the relationship between credit card issuers, holders, and merchants. It establishes obligations for issuers to provide clear account statements, afford debtors the right to contest charges within a specified timeframe, and prohibits excessive punitive interest rates. By prioritising transparency and due process, this law provides essential consumer protections relevant to credit card disputes like Pilot Case No. 2 discussed below.

5.4.2 National Consumer Protection Law (Law No. 24.240)²⁹

Law 24.240 establishes basic consumer rights, such as the right to accurate, clear, and complete information; equitable treatment; and protection from hazardous products or services. It also enables individuals or associations to file legal actions and class actions to protect consumers.

This norm matters especially for the Cooperation Agreement between the Judiciary of Mendoza and Kleros, as it expressly encourages the establishment of arbitration tribunals to resolve consumer-related claims. As set out in Article 59, these tribunals may operate as *amigables componedores* (friendly mediators) or as formal

²⁶ Translation by the author. Original wording of Article 232 paragraph j) reads as follows: “Los demás títulos que tuvieran fuerza ejecutiva por ley o por convención privada y no estén sujetos a un procedimiento especial.”

²⁷ Translation by the author. Original wording of Article 234, I, reads as follows: “Para acceder al proceso monitorio, el actor deberá presentar título con fuerza ejecutiva conforme la legislación de fondo, instrumento público o privado reconocido judicialmente o cuya firma estuviere certificada por escribano público y que de su contenido surja el derecho en que se funda la acción”

²⁸ National Law 25.065 [Texto actualizado | Argentina.gob.ar](#)

²⁹ National Law 24.240 [Texto actualizado | Argentina.gob.ar](#)

arbitrators applying the law, depending on the case. This way, the enforcement authority may invite qualified individuals proposed by consumer associations and business chambers to serve on these tribunals. Finally, the Article establishes that these bodies must operate in the City of Buenos Aires and the capitals of all provinces, applying the procedural rules of the jurisdiction where they are based.

This provision is highly significant to the Kleros cooperation because it establishes a legal basis for arbitration in consumer matters, with explicit support for participation by non-state actors. Moreover, the requirement for presence throughout Argentina's provinces legitimises the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms like Kleros in jurisdictions such as Mendoza, supporting the overall project's potential scalability within Argentina's consumer protection framework.

6. Overview of the Cooperation Agreement between Kleros and the Judiciary of Mendoza

After outlining how Kleros operates and the legal framework and structure of the Judiciary of Mendoza, the next step is to examine how these two systems were brought together.

This section provides an overview of the cooperation agreement that formalised the collaboration, detailing its objectives, institutional backing, and the framework under which the pilot project has been implemented.

6.1 Institutional and Legal Context

The Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza, as the highest judicial authority in the province, is the institution that formally approved the framework agreement with Kleros. In recent years, the Court of Mendoza has been actively engaged in efforts to modernise and innovate the local justice system.

In 2019, through Court Order (*acordada*) No. 29.321, the Court set out the vision, mission, values, and objectives of the Judiciary of Mendoza. Among its core principles, the Court emphasised the importance of innovation and the adoption of new technologies to improve the efficiency, transparency, and accessibility of judicial processes.

Furthering this commitment, in December 2023, the Supreme Court issued Court Order No. 31.420, establishing the Judicial Innovation Lab (*Laboratorio de Innovación Judicial*³⁰), a dedicated body to coordinate, lead and manage innovation projects. Notably, this Lab is the first of its kind in Latin America.

6.2 Court Order No. 31.624

On August 2, 2024, through Court Order (*acordada*) No. 31.624, the Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza formally approved the Framework Agreement on Cooperation and Technical Assistance between the Court and Coopérative Kleros (*Convenio Marco de Colaboración y Asistencia Técnica entre la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Provincia de Mendoza, y Cooperative Kleros*).

In this resolution, the Mr President of the Supreme Court, Dr Dalmiro Garay Cueli, along with Court Ministers Mario Daniel Adaro and Omar Palermo, emphasized that

³⁰ [JusLAB | Laboratorio de Innovación Judicial |](#)

the pilot experience would serve as a basis for generating improvement proposals and recommendations for potential replication in other courts.

The Framework Agreement was annexed to the Court Order.

6.3 Framework Agreement on Cooperation and Technical Assistance between the Court of Mendoza and Coopérative Kleros

The agreement outlines, among other elements, the Purpose, Obligations of the Parties, and Duration of the cooperation.

Besides defining the scope of the collaboration, the agreement specifies the commitments and actions of both parties during the pilot phase and lays the groundwork for broader cooperation. Specifically, it aims to explore the use of Kleros' decentralised dispute resolution system within the Judiciary of Mendoza. The intention is to engage local citizens as jurors in order to incorporate new mechanisms that could contribute to a faster and fairer justice system.

Among the Obligations, the agreement highlights the parties' mutual commitment to collaboration. The selected court, tribunal, or judicial office must send Kleros data on unresolved cases within its jurisdiction. Where possible, such data should be anonymised. Kleros is responsible for providing the necessary resources to process this data and ensure anonymisation if it has not already occurred. It will then submit the cases to its decentralised resolution system, where they will be adjudicated by jurors randomly selected through the platform. Once a decision is rendered, the relevant judicial office will be notified. If deemed appropriate, the court may inform the parties involved that Kleros participated in the process.

Importantly, the decisions issued by Kleros are non-binding and only consultative in nature. The court or tribunal will not be required to consider the decision or its reasoning and retains full discretion as to whether or not to take it into account.

Regarding case eligibility, Obligation No. 7 of the agreement establishes that Kleros and the relevant court or tribunal will jointly determine which cases may be submitted to the platform. The criteria include the complexity of the case, the suitability of the evidence to the Kleros system, and the feasibility of anonymising the parties' data.

In addition, the agreement includes Kleros' commitment to create a dedicated court composed of local jurors tokenised within its system for use by the Judiciary of Mendoza. This will be implemented in a second phase of the collaboration. Both parties agree to train these jurors in how to access and operate the platform using

their token credentials.

The agreement establishes an initial term of two years, which may be automatically extended unless either party gives notice to the contrary.

The pilot program will be carried out specifically in the Peace and Contraventional Court of Laval, a jurisdiction within the Province of Mendoza, and under the direction of Judge María Fernanda Díaz, as outlined under Section 5 of the Framework Agreement.

6.4 Media Coverage and Outreach Impact of the Pilot Initiative

The launch of the pilot drew attention from both local and international media. In October 2024, *Infobae* reported that Mendoza's "justice system is testing a technological tool that enables disputes to be resolved in just two days" through blockchain and Kleros. The article highlighted the pilot's location in the Peace and Contraventional Court of Laval, and neighbour and consumer disputes as the pilot's focus.³¹

The media *CriptoTendencias* described the agreement as an agile alternative for certain civil cases, which could mark the start of a new era. In the article, Judge Díaz is cited: *"The people will be the ones to decide whether this technological system can resolve their disputes. As a justice system, we must embrace new challenges and improve the quality of the service, always guaranteeing the constitutional rights of the citizens."*³²

At the *Merge Buenos Aires 2025* conference, the Supreme Court of Mendoza presented the Kleros pilot as a pioneering initiative in blockchain-powered dispute resolution. Supreme Court Justice Mario Adaro spoke alongside Kleros Executive Director Federico Ast at the event held at the Palacio Libertad, emphasizing that this represents "the first-ever collaboration between the legal-judicial sector and a crypto jury system."³³

Finally, *The Defiant* characterised the agreement as "a groundbreaking progression in the modernisation of the judicial process in Argentina" and noted that this integration allows an anonymous and fairer juror base while offering a more cost-effective, quick and innovative approach to court processes.³⁴

³¹ [La Justicia de Mendoza prueba una herramienta tecnológica que permite resolver casos en dos días - Infobae](#)
³²

<https://www.criptotendencias.com/actualidad/kleros-una-herramienta-digital-para-juicios-por-jurados-en-la-justicia-de-mendoza/>, translation by the author.

³³ [La Suprema Corte de Mendoza presentó su experiencia Kleros en el evento Cripto más importante de la Argentina - Poder Judicial Mendoza](#)

³⁴ [Kleros to Collaborate with Supreme Court of Mendoza - "The Defiant"](#)

7. Results of the Pilot Cases

As of the date of writing, three pilot cases have been initiated and resolved. This section addresses their results.

7.1 Pilot Case No. 1

7.1.1 Selection and Preparation of Pilot Case No. 1

The first test case was based on a real traffic accident case previously resolved by the Lavalle Court. The objective was to assess whether Kleros could reach a comparable resolution to that of the court, in accordance with the law and with a reasoned justification.

Although the agreement between Kleros and the Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza is designed primarily for simpler cases, this particular case was selected due to its medium-to-high complexity, to test Kleros' capacity.

For the preparation of Pilot Case No. 1, the arguments of both parties were simplified, and documentary and expert evidence were included. The case was anonymised, and minor modifications were made to avoid revealing the actual judicial file.

Additionally, a specific policy on traffic accidents was created for this pilot case, which the Kleros jury could consult as guidance. This policy included civil law principles and rules applicable to traffic accidents in the Province of Mendoza. To challenge the jury's analytical skills, the policy included not only applicable rules but also non-applicable ones that required deeper legal reasoning.

7.1.2 Facts of Pilot Case No. 1

In Case #357,³⁵ Bob sued Alice for damages resulting from an accident at the intersection of Route 24 and Chacón Street. Bob claimed that he was driving his Ford along Route 24 when, upon reaching the intersection, he reduced speed and activated his turn signal before making a left turn into Chacón. At that point, he was rear-ended by a Fiat driven by Alice. Bob alleged that the accident was solely due to Alice's negligence, more specifically, her excessive speed and failure to maintain a safe following distance.³⁶

In her defence, Alice denied that Bob had reduced his speed or used his turn signal. She argued that the accident was caused by Bob's own recklessness. According to Alice, Bob made an illegal left turn across a double yellow line, prior to the permitted turn area, and toward an irregular and unauthorised access point before

³⁵ Case #357 (in Spanish): lemon.kleros.io/en/case/357

³⁶ Bob's claim (in Spanish): [Demanda \(Bob\)](#)

Chacón Street.³⁷

7.1.3 Decision in Pilot Case No. 1

A Kleros jury composed of six members unanimously determined that both Bob and Alice shared responsibility. The jury found that, according to expert evidence, Bob had performed an illegal turn and that Alice had been speeding.

7.1.4 Comparison with the Decision of the Lavalle Court

In both the actual case and the pilot, the conclusion was that responsibility was shared. Comparing the arguments provided by the Kleros jury reveals significant similarities with those of the Lavalle Court. Three key elements were central in both decisions: vehicle speed, the turning manoeuvre, and the double yellow line.

7.1.5 Preliminary Conclusions

The outcome of Pilot Case No. 1 is significant for several reasons:

- **Legitimacy:** Its results demonstrate Kleros' capacity to resolve complex disputes coherently and reasonably, reinforced by the impartiality of a randomly selected jury.
- **Efficiency:** It shows potential to resolve low-complexity cases in a matter of days, thereby expediting judicial processes.
- **Cost-effectiveness:** It indicates Kleros could provide a potentially more affordable solution for simpler conflicts.
- **Innovation:** Ultimately, it positions Kleros as an innovative alternative for dispute resolution.

7.2 Pilot Case No. 2

7.2.1 Selection and Preparation of Pilot Case No. 2

The second test case was also based on a real dispute previously adjudicated by the Peace and Contraventional Court of Lavalle. It involved a claim for unpaid credit card charges, in which the plaintiff sought recovery of the amount due, including interest and legal costs.

For this case, a Policy³⁸ with general rules regarding credit card debt was prepared by the Court and provided to the jury. Ultimately, jurors were given two voting options: to uphold or reject the claim.

³⁷ Alice's answer to claim (in Spanish): [Contestación de demanda \(Alice\)](#)

³⁸ Credit Cards Debt Policy for case #424 (in Spanish): [Policy Deudas Tarjetas - Corte de Mendoza](#)

7.2.2 Facts of Pilot Case No. 2

In Case #424,³⁹ Bank Bob sued Ms. Alice for unpaid credit card charges. As evidence, Bank Bob submitted the account statements showing the outstanding balances.

In her response, Ms Alice requested dismissal of the claim, arguing that the statements did not meet legal requirements and that the interest rates applied were abusive.

7.2.3 Decision in Pilot Case No. 2

The jury unanimously ruled to dismiss the claim. The decision was based on the lack of transparency regarding compensatory and punitive interest rates, which violated formal policy requirements and infringed on consumer rights such as the right to complete and transparent information.

7.2.4 Comparison with the Decision of the Lavalle Court

The Kleros jury's ruling aligned with the decision issued by the Lavalle Court. In rejecting the bank's claim, the court also cited violations of Sections L, M, and N of Article 23 of Argentine Law No. 25.065, which governs the credit card system.

7.2.5 Preliminary Conclusions

Pilot Case No. 2 can also be considered a successful outcome, as the Kleros jury's decision was consistent with that of the Lavalle Court.

7.3 Pilot Case No. 3

7.3.1 Selection and Preparation of Pilot Case No. 3

As well as the two pilot cases analysed above, the Case No. 3 was based on a real dispute previously adjudicated by the Peace and Contraventional Court of Lavalle.

7.3.2 Facts of Pilot Case No. 3

Similar to Pilot Case No.2, Case No. 3 (Case #80 of Kleros Beta)⁴⁰ concerned a claim for unpaid credit cards charges. An anonymized bank filed a claim against an anonymized client for the payment of three million one hundred seventy-four thousand two hundred fifty-nine Argentine pesos (ARS 3.174.259,05). This amount includes not only the outstanding credit card charges but also the accrued interest. As evidence, the bank submitted bank statements.⁴¹

7.3.3. Decision in Pilot Case No. 3

In the first round, six Kleros jurors participated in the voting, and unanimously voted to reject the claim.

³⁹ Case #424 (in Spanish): lemon.kleros.io/es/case/424

⁴⁰ Case #80 Beta (in Spanish): <https://v2.kleros.builders/#/cases/80>

⁴¹ Bank's claim (in Spanish): [Demanda de Cobro de Deuda](#)

All jurors rejected the bank's claim because the evidence showed that the amount sought was calculated by charging interest on previously accrued interest (capitalized interest), a practice expressly prohibited by the applicable dispute policies, consumer protection laws, and Law No. 25,065 on Credit Cards.

The statements provided by the bank were considered to lack a clear and verifiable breakdown of the interest calculations, contained inconsistencies and unexplained rate increases far above the contractual terms, and did not adequately detail charges such as the composition of the minimum payment. The bank failed to prove the validity of the claimed amount with sufficient documentation or contractual support, and given the principle that doubts in consumer disputes must be resolved in favor of the consumer, the claim was deemed invalid.

7.3.4 Comparison with the Decision of the Lavalle Court

Interestingly, once more the outcome reached by the Kleros Court was not far from the original decision made by the Court, considering that the only available voting options were: 1. Refuse to Arbitrate / Invalid, 2. Confirm the Claim, or 3. Reject the Claim.

In this sense, Judge María Fernanda Díaz had partially upheld the claim, accepting only the charges corresponding to the actual expenses of the claimee, together with compensatory and punitive interest, but excluding any capitalized interest.

The decision of the Lavalle Court was thus reflected in the Kleros ruling not only in the rejection of the capitalized charges, but also in the application of the Consumer Protection Law in that the contract must be interpreted in the most favourable way for the consumer.

Overall, the Kleros jurors interpreted the Credit Card Policy drafted for this particular case in a robust and holistic manner, arriving at a conclusion highly consistent to that of the Judge of the Court of Lavalle.

8. Scaling Decentralised Justice: Replication Potential and Legal Pathways

8.1 Legal Pathways for Operationalising Kleros in Argentina and Mendoza

One of the key questions raised by this pilot experience is whether a decentralised justice protocol such as Kleros can be operationalised more broadly within the Argentine legal system without requiring legislative reform. In its current form, the pilot in Mendoza relies on non-binding, consultative decisions issued by Kleros jurors. These decisions are ultimately reviewed and adopted (or not) by the relevant judge. This pilot model fits within the existing procedural framework and does not require further formal recognition of Kleros as an arbitral tribunal.

Notably, one possible legal basis for such an expansion may be found in Article 59 of Argentina's National Consumer Protection Law (Law No. 24.240). As mentioned in Section 5.4.2, this provision expressly allows for the establishment of arbitration tribunals to resolve consumer-related claims. It further states that these tribunals may act either as *amigables componedores* (friendly mediators) or as formal arbitrators applying the law. Crucially, the law allows for participation by individuals proposed by consumer associations and business chambers, and it mandates that such tribunals operate in the capitals of each province.

If, in the future, the Province of Mendoza were to establish a dedicated pool of Kleros jurors composed of verified local residents, and apply it specifically to consumer disputes, it may be possible to interpret the decisions of this court as falling under the category of *amigables componedores* as described in Article 59. Under this reading, Kleros would serve not as a private arbitration mechanism, but as a recognised consumer dispute resolution body supported by institutional partnerships and rooted in territorial jurisdiction.

A second possible legal route for operationalising Kleros within the Argentina's legal framework is through the *monitorio* process set out in Article 232 of the Civil, Commercial, and Tax Procedural Code of Mendoza (Law No. 9001). This process allows for the expedited enforcement of certain types of obligations based on instruments with executive force. Specifically, paragraph j) of Article 232 states that the procedure may be used in cases involving "other instruments that have executive force by law or by private agreement and are not subject to a special procedure."

This clause raises an important question: Could a decision rendered by a Kleros jury, if the parties have contractually agreed to accept it as binding, be considered such an instrument? If the answer is yes, it would mean that Kleros' decisions could be submitted as the basis for initiating a *monitorio* proceeding in the Mendoza courts. The requirements under Article 234 (that the enforceable instrument be presented and that it derive from a legal or notarial source) would still apply, and ultimately, the judge would need to issue an order executing the claim. However, the procedure establishes a fast timeline: once the requirements are met, the judge has five days to issue a decision.

Of course, this interpretation depends on how the courts choose to classify a blockchain-based jury decision under the scope of “executive force by private agreement.” While there is precedent for this in other Latin American jurisdictions (such as the case mentioned earlier in this report, where a Mexican court accepted a Kleros decision as valid within an arbitral framework) it remains untested under Mendoza law.

If such an interpretation were to be accepted in Mendoza, it could create a model for replicability in provinces which may share similar frameworks for *monitorio* or executive processes. Therefore, a successful application of this method in Mendoza could encourage other provinces to explore the same approach.⁴²

These are, of course, speculative interpretations, and it is not yet clear whether a decentralised jury system such as Kleros could legally be subsumed under the framework established by Article 59 of National Law No 24.240, or Article 232 of Mendoza's Law No 9001. Questions remain about institutional oversight, procedural guarantees, and how traditional legal concepts such as jurisdiction and authority apply to blockchain-based systems. Nevertheless, if this interpretation were accepted, it could pave the way for other Argentinian provinces to integrate Kleros in similar ways.

8.2 Conditions for Scalability

In the previous section, we looked at some of the legal pathways that might allow Kleros to be scaled and incorporated more broadly in Argentina. But scaling a decentralised justice system like this is not just a legal and regulatory question. Even if the law allows it, other conditions have to be in place for the system to work in practice. These include, among others, technical capabilities, institutional support, and public trust. In this section, we take a closer look at those elements.

⁴² Notwithstanding the foregoing, Article 14, paragraph (h) of the National Credit Card Law expressly prohibits this direct route for executing payments related to credit cards: it declares null and void any clause that allows the direct initiation of enforcement proceedings to collect debts arising from credit card use.

8.2.1 Technical Infrastructure

For Kleros to be used beyond pilots, courts need some degree of digital capacity and technical setup. Even though the platform runs in a web browser and doesn't require heavy infrastructure, the process still involves digital submissions, access to files, and interaction with a blockchain-based platform. Court staff need to be able to handle the tool safely and in a way that fits efficiently into their existing workflows. If the infrastructure isn't there, or if staff aren't trained to use it, the system could face serious operational barriers.

Conveniently, Kleros Enterprise may offer a potential solution. As a unit within the Kleros Cooperative, it is designed to facilitate the use of the Kleros Protocol by mainstream institutions, including companies and public bodies. Through this service, disputes can be submitted to the Kleros network and resolved by its jurors, without requiring the partner organization to engage with the underlying technical infrastructure.

From the user's perspective, it functions similarly to traditional business process outsourcing. Kleros Enterprise handles all technical aspects, including uploading disputes to the platform, thereby minimizing the need for digital readiness or technical capacity on the part of the institution. Overall, this model could help lower operational barriers in contexts where digital infrastructure or staff training is limited.⁴³

8.2.2 Institutional and Political Support

Beyond the legal framework and the technical capabilities, the broader context of a jurisdiction also plays a key role. The Judiciary of Mendoza is a good setting for this pilot because there is strong support at the institutional level. The Supreme Court backed the initiative, there was an existing structure (the Innovation Lab and other technological developments) that gave the project a base, and a judge in Lavalle who is actively engaged. Without that kind of leadership and engagement, similar projects may not get off the ground. This kind of support is just as important as the legal or technical components.

8.2.3 Public Trust and Legitimacy

Finally, any justice system (being it centralised or decentralised) depends on public trust to function. If users feel like the system is opaque, untrustworthy, or just too unfamiliar, they will not rely on it. In the case of Kleros, public communication, training, and outreach will be essential, as well as being transparent, open to questions, and ready to adapt based on feedback. To build legitimacy, citizens need to understand who the jurors are, how they are chosen, and what kind of cases the system is meant to resolve.

⁴³ For more information about how Kleros Enterprise works, you may consult the following article by Federico Ast, Marcos Pernas, y Facundo T.: "Kleros Enterprise: Dispute Resolution for Companies and Governments", 12 June 2024, [Kleros Enterprise: Dispute Resolution for Companies and Governments](#).

9. Conclusion

This report has presented the results of the cooperation project carried out between the Judiciary of Mendoza and the decentralised justice protocol Kleros. It has examined the operational mechanics of Kleros, including its approach to juror selection, identity verification, and decision-making, as well as the legal and institutional framework within which the pilot took place. The cooperation agreement that enabled the project was described in detail, alongside the three completed pilot cases.

In addition to documenting the implementation, the report analysed the potential legal pathways for integrating Kleros more permanently into Argentina's judicial landscape. These include its possible use in consumer protection disputes under Article 59 of the National Consumer Protection Law, and its application in the *monitorio* procedure under Mendoza's provincial procedural code. While both routes are the author's speculation and not free from legal uncertainty, both present potential avenues for future application without the need for legislative amendments, provided that key institutional and procedural safeguards are met.

Beyond Mendoza, the pilot shows potential for scalability in other Argentine provinces that share similar procedural rules or innovation-minded judicial environments. It also opens up possibilities for regional exploration, particularly in Latin American jurisdictions that have embraced alternative dispute resolution and digital governance tools, such as the case of a Court in Jalisco, Mexico. However, while there is momentum, the next steps should be approached with caution. Introducing decentralised justice into public systems should be done with adequate evaluation and guarantees to ensure essential procedural protections, and with transparency, openness and education to make this a familiar mechanism for citizens.

That said, I remain very positive about the role Kleros could play in this space. Over time, the project has shown flexibility and openness to change. In response to legitimate criticism (such as concerns over juror anonymity and the ethics of purely financial incentives) the Kleros team has adapted the protocol, implementing identity verification through tools like Proof of Humanity and exploring more contextualised models for juror selection. I am confident that if new issues emerge as use expands, they will be taken seriously and investigated thoroughly, and that improvements will follow where needed.

Argentina has a long tradition of pioneering legal and institutional innovations, from ground-breaking civil codes to bold experiments in digital identity and civic technology. Following this path, this cooperation agreement between a provincial judiciary and a decentralised protocol is not an anomaly, but a natural continuation



of a country willing to test the limits of what is possible. It is exciting to see where this pilot and the discussion it has started may lead the country, and perhaps the wider region, in the search for more accessible, participatory, and expedite forms of justice.

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